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JANUARY 2013 Volume 54 
The Long-Term International Law Implications of 
Targeted Killing Practices 
 An article from the symposium, “State Ethics: Controlling the Behavior 
of Governments and Their Partners” 
 
Christof Heyns & Sarah Knuckey* 
One of the most crucial and enduring questions about “targeted killings” is: How will 
the currently expanding practices of singling out individuals in advance and 
eliminating them in other countries without accountability impact the established 
international legal system? 
International law, since at least World War II, has developed various mechanisms to 
limit killing in general, including targeted killings. These take the form of vigorous 
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protections for the right to life under human rights law; safeguards against the inter-
state use of force while permitting states to protect themselves where necessary; and 
aiming to strike a balance between the principles of humanity and military necessity 
during armed conflict through international humanitarian law (IHL).1  
Targeted killings are not a new practice – governments have long sought to prevail 
over their enemies by engaging in premeditated killings of individual suspects.2 What 
is new now is the rapid development and proliferation,3 and increasing deployment,4 
of technologies which permit such killings to be carried out with greater ease and with 
little immediate risk to one side’s citizens, together with concerted efforts by some to 
                                                 
 
1 Many efforts have also been directed at banning or regulating specific weapons. For an 
overview of the major disarmament treaties, see Bonnie Docherty, Ending Civilian Suffering: The 
Purpose, Provisions, and Promise of Humanitarian Disarmament Law, AUSTL. REV. OF INT’L & EUR. L. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
2 See Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: Study on Targeted Killings, 
Human Rights Council, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip 
Alston) [hereinafter Rep. of the Special Rapporteur: Study on Targeted Killings] (referring to previous 
targeted killings, and describing the general practice of states to deny such killings, and of 
other states to condemn them). 
3 See generally P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 
Twenty-First Century (2009) (describing the development of drone technology for military 
purposes); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-536, Nonproliferation: Agencies Could 
Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports 
9 (July 2012) (describing the “rapid growth globally in UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] 
acquisition, development, and military applications.”). New and smaller, faster, and more 
sophisticated drone technologies are now regularly reported as being developed.  
4 Drone strikes, generally, have drastically increased, although the proportion of these that 
would qualify as targeted killings in the various theaters of use is, on publicly available 
information, unclear. Under President Bush, the U.S. carried out an estimated 52 drone strikes 
in Pakistan. Under President Obama, there have been some 301 reported strikes. In addition, 
there have been at least 40 reported strikes in Yemen, and since 2011, there have been some 
strikes in Somalia. See Covert War on Terror–The Data, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-data/ (last visited Dec. 07, 
2012) [hereinafter Covert War on Terror–The Data]. The number of drone strikes overall appears 
to be the highest in Afghanistan, where a reported 333 strikes took place in 2012 alone. See 
Noah Shachtman, Military Stats Reveal Epicenter of U.S. Drone War, WIRED (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/drones-afghan-air-war/. It was recently 
reported that since 2008, almost 1,200 drone strikes took place (by the U.S. and the U.K.) in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. See Chris Woods & Alice K. Ross, Revealed: U.S. and Britain 
Launched 1,200 Drone Strikes in Recent Wars, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 4, 
2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/12/04/revealed-us-and-britain-launched-
1200-drone-strikes-in-recent-wars/. U.S. Special Operations kill/capture raids in Afghanistan 
have also reportedly increased under President Obama. See Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings: 





offer general legal justifications for current targeted killings practices, and, in some 
cases, to attempt to redefine existing legal frameworks to expand the circumstances in 
which such killings may be carried out “lawfully.”5 
A small number of states with the necessary capabilities – particularly the United 
States – clearly find targeted killing attractive today. As unmanned aerial technologies 
becomes more widely available, many other states may feel the same pull towards the 
advantages of drone attacks in the future. Some 76 countries now have unmanned 
aerial systems,6 it has recently been reported that the Pentagon has approved the 
export of drones from U.S. manufacturers to 66 countries,7 and reports suggest that 
an increasing number of countries are developing their own armed drones.8  
Current targeted killings practices and the attempts to legally justify those strikes 
present a challenge to the systematic protection of the right to life under international 
law. We are now witnessing a significant effort by some states to insulate their 
“targeted” uses of deadly force from international scrutiny and to redefine 
international law in order to serve narrow and short-term interests. This presents a 
serious risk of leaving everyone less secure, particularly if other states around the 
world, as they acquire the new technology, claim for themselves the same expanded 
rights to target their enemies without meaningful transparency or accountability. 
The challenge is to ensure that strong protections of the right to life under 
international law survive the practices of a few states, technological developments, 
and outlier attempts to redefine core legal standards. 
                                                 
 
5 It is important not to overly-focus on the technologies themselves. Targeted killings, 
whether carried out by drone or sniper, raise essentially the same legal issues and are 
constrained by the same legal frameworks. However, it is also important to recognize that 
drones are presently perceived by those who deploy them to offer new opportunities and 
unique advantages for expanded surveillance and targeting, and that in this sense they appear 
to be facilitating the expanding practice, policy, and legal frontiers of targeted killings.   
6 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 15 (providing information that 
since 2005, the number of countries that have acquired a UAV system jumped from 42 to at 
least 76).  
7 Actual sales will need approval by the U.S. State Dep’t and Cong. See Doug Palmer & Jim 
Wolf, Pentagon OK with Selling U.S. Drones to 66 Countries, NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/06/13695931-pentagon-ok-with-selling-usU.S.-
drones-to-66-countries?lite. 
8 See, e.g., Sukhoi to Build Strike, Recon Unmanned Planes, RIA NOVOSTI (Nov. 13, 2012 10:58 
AM), http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20121113/177420795.html (describing armed UAV 
developments in Russia); Staff Writers, Latest China Military Hardware Displayed at Airshow, 
SPACE TRAVEL (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.space-
travel.com/reports/Latest_China_military_hardware_displayed_at_airshow_999.html 
(describing armed UAV developments in China); Jon Boone, Pakistan Developing Combat Drones, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/13/drones-
pakistan (reporting efforts by Pakistan to develop its own armed UAV).  
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For the past decade, successive U.N. Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary, 
or arbitrary executions have reported on and sought accountability and transparency 
for targeted killings of various forms, including those in the context of the so-called 
“War on Terror.” Since the creation of the U.N. mandate thirty years ago in 1982, the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions has been the primary 
international actor with the mandate to investigate, prevent, and promote 
accountability for all unlawful killings under international human rights and IHL.9 The 
mandate exists to ensure respect for every individual’s right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of his or her life, to document and promote redress for violations, and to 
clarify the applicable international law. The mandate addresses a wide range of 
killings, including politically motivated killings by state agents, excessive use of force 
by law enforcement officials, custodial deaths, lack of due diligence by states in 
dealing with killings by private individuals, and violations of IHL during armed 
conflict by both government and non-state actors.10 
Over the years, successive mandate holders have addressed targeted killings carried 
out through drone strikes and kill/capture raids, and have built up a detailed record of 
individual cases and analysis of the applicable international law. In 2003, for example, 
then U.N. Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, concluded that a 2002 U.S. strike in 
Yemen was a “clear” extrajudicial execution.11 Since then, numerous official U.N. 
communications have been exchanged with the U.S. government about targeted 
killings, seeking clarification about incidents as well as the U.S. government’s views on 
                                                 
 
9 See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1982/29, ¶ 2 (Mar. 11, 1982); Econ. & Soc. 
Council Res. 1982/35, ¶ 2 (May 7, 1982); Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/16 (Jan. 31, 1983) (by S. Amos Wako); 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions: Rep. by the Special Rapporteur, Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/30 
(Jan. 31, 1992) (by S. Amos Wako); Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Human 
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/8/3 (Jun. 18, 2008); Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/17/5 (Jul. 6, 
2011). 
10 For details on each of the primary forms of extrajudicial executions addressed by the 
mandate, as well as the relevant international law, see Philip Alston & Sarah Knuckey, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS (forthcoming 2013). See 
also Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 5–12, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7 (Dec. 22, 2004) (by Philip Alston).  
11 See Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 39, U.N. 




the applicable law.12 Country mission reports on Afghanistan and the United States 
have documented targeted killings, raised concerns about the legality of particular 
strikes, and called for accountability.13 In 2010, then U.N. Special Rapporteur 
Professor, Philip Alston, reported in detail to the U.N. Human Rights Council on the 
legal frameworks and rules relevant to targeted killings,14 as well as to the U.N. 
General Assembly on accountability failures and of potentially “grave damage” to the 
                                                 
 
12 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: Summary of Cases 
Transmitted to Government and Replies Received, Human Rights Council, 342–61, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/20/Add.1 (Mar. 12, 2007) (by Philip Alston). In response to the Special 
Rapporteur’s work on this issue, the U.S. initially adopted the novel and untenable position 
that the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Special Rapporteur have no mandate to address 
killings which took place (or which the U.S. said took place) in an armed conflict. See Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: Summary of Cases Transmitted to Government 
and Replies Received, Comm’n on Human Rights, 264–65, E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 
2006) (by Philip Alston) (allegation letter sent to the U.S. government about the killing by 
drone strike of Haitham al-Yemeni in May 2005). See also id., at 125–36 (concerning alleged 
targeted killings by Israel); Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: 
Observations on Communications Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, Human Rights 
Council, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/22/Add.4 (June 18, 2012) (by Christof Heyns) 
(concerning killing of Osama bin Laden); id., ¶ 85 (concerning alleged use of drones in targeted 
killing by U.S. government in Yemen); Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Addendum: Summary of Information, Including Cases, Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, 
Human Rights Council, 394, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/28/Add.1 (May 27, 2011) (by Christof 
Heyns) (concerning alleged targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki by the U.S. government); 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: Follow-Up to Country 
Recommendations, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/3/Add.3 (May 14, 2008) (by 
Philip Alston) (concerning alleged targeted killings by Sri Lankan forces and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam). 
13 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: Follow-Up to Country 
Recommendations – United States of America, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/20/22/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2012) (by Christof Heyns) (following up on country 
recommendations after visit to the U.S. in 2008); Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Addendum: Mission to the United States of America, Human Rights Council, ¶ 71–73, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/11/2/Add.5 (May 28, 2009) (by Philip Alston); id., ¶ 83 (reporting on targeted 
killings by the U.S.); Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. 
of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum: Mission to 
Afghanistan, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/2/Add.4 (May 6, 2009) (by Philip 
Alston) (reporting on alleged targeted killings by U.S. raids in Afghanistan).  
14 See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur: Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 28–36. 
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“legal framework that the international community has so painstakingly constructed in 
order to protect the right to life.”15 The U.N. Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial 
executions and on counter-terrorism have also asked the U.S. government for factual 
and legal clarification after the killing of Osama bin Laden.16 In October 2012, the 
Special Rapporteurs announced that they would report to the United Nations in 2013 
on the legal and factual issues around targeted killings, and an initiative will be 
launched to investigate strikes.17 The U.S. has signaled that it is considering 
cooperating with this investigative work, a step that would go a significant way 
towards restoring international accountability.18  
The applicable basic principles of international law relevant to the taking of life are 
clear and tested by time. International law does not wholesale prohibit targeted 
killings. Rather, rules have developed to impose principled limits on all uses of lethal 
force, and to ensure that the limits are respected through meaningful transparency and 
accountability. (Indeed, in some circumstances, “targeted” killings are precisely what 
international law prescribes.). However, as evidenced by both government practices 
and legal pronouncements, some states appear to want to offer only general legal 
justifications for highly contentious practices, to invent new law, or to stretch existing 
law beyond long-accepted understandings.  
This issue will remain on the international agenda for the foreseeable future, and it is 
important to consider the outlines of the terrain. What rules bind states and should 
continue to guide action in the future? 
                                                 
 
15 Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Interim Rep. of the 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, General Assembly, ¶ 11, U.N. 
Doc. A/65/321 (Aug. 23, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Interim Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur to the General Assembly].  
16 See Press Release, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Osama bin 
Laden: Statement by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Summary Executions and on Human Rights and 
Counter-Terrorism (May 6, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10987&LangID=E; see also Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, Addendum: Observations on Communications Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, 
Human Rights Council, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/22/Add.4 (Jun. 18, 2012) (by Christof 
Heyns) (calling for factual and legal clarification surrounding the killing of Osama bin Laden). 
17 See Owen Bowcott, UN to Investigate Civilian Deaths from US Drone Strikes, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
25, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/25/un-inquiry-us-drone-
strikes?newsfeed=true.  






It is undisputed that the right to life is part of international customary law19, and as 
such it imposes legal duties on all states, irrespective of their ratification of specific 
treaties. Some see the right to life as “the supreme right,” and it has been described as 
a norm of jus cogens.20  
Operations in the territory of other countries could potentially violate state 
sovereignty, and they may be considered acts of aggression in violation of the UN 
Charter absent consent or legitimate self-defense.21 While self-defense has been 
advanced as a justification for targeted killings,22 it is far from clear that its established 
legal confines have been satisfied in actual current practice. Self-defense (and the use 
of force on another state’s territory) is justified in response to an “armed attack” that 
meets the required threshold, and there must be a direct link between the “armed 
attack” and the subsequent use of force in self-defense. As a general rule, self-defense 
may only justify force in response to attacks that have already occurred.23 It is difficult 
to see in most cases how targeted killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as a self-
defense response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. As 
targeted killings take place in more and more countries and against more groups with, 
                                                 
 
19 See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24 on Issues Relating to Reservations Made 
upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to 
Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, ¶¶ 8, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 
(Nov. 4, 1994); see also MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 122 (2005); NIGEL S. RODLEY & MATT POLLARD, THE 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (2009). 
20 See Human Rights Comm., supra note 21, at ¶¶ 8, 10; see also U.N. Secretariat, Compilation 
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.8 (May 8, 2006).  
21 U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51; see also Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 35, 45, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24 (May 20, 2010) (by Phillip 
Alston).  
22 Various senior U.S. officials have justified targeted killings practices on the basis that they 
are carried out in the context of an armed conflict, and/or that they are a manifestation of the 
state’s inherent right of self-defense. Following significant pressure from civil society calling 
upon the U.S. government to explain how its targeted killings practices comport with 
international law, over the last two years, U.S. officials have made a number of public speeches 
briefly explaining and seeking to legally justify current policies. See, e.g., Eric Holder, Attorney 
General, Dep’t of Justice, Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html; Harold K. 
Koh, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.  
23 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
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at best, tenuous links to those responsible for the September 11 attacks, this difficulty 
only increases. 
What about new threats? While states may engage in self-defense against truly 
“imminent” attacks, there is little available evidence to suggest that all of those 
individuals targeted by drone attacks would meet this requirement. The premeditated 
nature of targeted killings means that, in many cases, claims of imminence ring 
hollow. The reported presence for long periods of time of the names of those on “kill 
lists,” for example, undermines claims of such an imminent threat. More permissive 
standards of “pre-emptive strikes,” without a clear basis in the U.N. Charter, are being 
advanced in support of what would normally be regarded as acts of aggression. 
Indeed, it appears that the U.S. is attempting to redefine “imminence.”24 As noted 
above, if one government is allowed to use force whenever it is of the opinion that 
there is some perceived danger that may be realized at some point in the future, with 
no transparency or accountability, there is no basis on which to hold others back from 
doing the same.  
Moreover, it is clear that even where consent or a self-defense justification for inter-
state force is present, it does not obviate the need for further inquiry into whether the 
demands of IHL or international human rights law have been met in respect of the 
particular use of force. The question of the legality of extra-territorial use of force 
should not be confused with the question of the legality of the use of lethal force 
against a particular target. These are two separate inquiries. Questions of jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello should not be conflated. The “self-defense” test pertains to whether the 
use of inter-state force is or is not a violation of state sovereignty, and to when a state 
may use force extra-territorially. It does not answer the question of whether the 
specific type, level, timing, or scope of force used is lawful vis-à-vis the individual 
targeted person. The legality of this use of force depends on whether it complies with 
either human rights law or IHL.25 
                                                 
 
24 See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE 
LETHAL TARGETING OF U.S. CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES 14–20 (May 4, 
2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/target.pdf; see also Human Rights First, How to 
Ensure that the U.S. Drone Program Does Not Undermine Human Rights: Blueprint for the 
Next Administration 4 (December, 2012), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/blueprints2012/HRF_Targeted_Killing_blueprint.pdf; Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, General Assembly, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. A/66/330 (Aug. 
30, 2011) (by Christof Heyns). 
25 See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur: Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 4, ¶ 28–36; see also D. 
FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1–15 (2008); Kevin Jon 
Heller, One Hell of a Killing Machine: Signature Strikes and International Law, J. OF INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3–5) (noting that this position is “widely 




Where there is no armed conflict, international human rights law applies. Human 
rights law affords a high level of protection to the right to life: the use of force must 
be strictly necessary and proportionate. Lethal force may only intentionally be used where 
necessary to counter an imminent threat to life.26 Unless the requirements of an 
armed conflict are met, international human rights law applies strictly – and it is far 
from clear on publicly available evidence that all of the targeted individuals posed an 
imminent threat to life, and that lethal force was in fact necessary.27 It is also 
important to note that the obligation under human rights law to respect the right to 
life binds not only the state employing lethal force against an individual, but also, 
where lethal force is used extraterritorially, the state on whose territory any attack 
takes place.28 
In the exceptional situation of armed conflict, the lex specialis rules of IHL also apply, 
and any killings must satisfy the foundational principles of proportionality, distinction, 
necessity, and humanity.29 With respect to the question of whether an armed conflict 
exists, it is unhelpful to talk about a “hot” or a “cold” battlefield – either the killing is 
carried out in an armed conflict or it is not. The test for determining whether an 
armed conflict exists is an objective one, and it is not determined according to the 
mere subjective will or pronouncements of the parties involved.30 In addition, and 
importantly, the targeted individual must be a lawful target: in the context of non-
international armed conflict, the key legal test is that they must directly participate in 
hostilities.31  
                                                                                                                            
 
Michael Elliot, Where Precision Is the Aim: Locating the Targeted Killing Policies of the 
United States and Israel within International Humanitarian Law, 47 CAN. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 108 
(2009). 
26 See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur: Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 4, ¶ 33. 
27 The facts reported in the following story, for example, raise general questions about the 
necessity of lethal force: Adam Baron, Family, Neighbors of Yemeni Killed by U.S. Drone Wonder 
Why He Wasn’t Taken Alive, MCCLATCHY (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/11/28/175794/family-neighbors-of-yemeni-
killed.html#storylink=cpy#storylink=cpy?storylink=addthis#storylink=cpy. 
28 Thus, for example, to the extent that a state in fact consents to the use of force by 
another state on its territory, it cannot in law consent to violations by the attacking state of the 
right to life of those within its jurisdiction. The state on whose territory attacks take place is 
under a legal obligation to protect their right to life.  
29 See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur: Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 4, ¶ 29. 
30 See id. ¶ 46. 
31 See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE 
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (May 2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-
0990.pdf (outlining the civilian direct participation in hostilities, and continuous combat 
function tests). In this sense, the widespread use of the term “militant” in public discourse is 
deeply unsatisfactory. “Militant” is not a legal category, and obfuscates attempts to determine 
the legality of any particular targeting decision and strike. 
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It is not at all clear that the targeted killings carried out by the U.S. are taking place 
against individuals directly participating in a recognized armed conflict, and in 
accordance with the specific rules of IHL. Although U.S. officials have relied on the 
existence of an armed conflict against al Qaeda and the ill-defined “associated forces” 
category as the basis for the legality of targeted killings, the U.S. government has 
presented little to no evidence to indicate that all strikes have in fact taken place 
against direct participants in hostilities or – if that category is used – against 
individuals who have a continuous combat function in an armed group which is a 
party to a recognized armed conflict. Strikes have also taken place in circumstances 
where it is far from evident that sufficient precautions in attack were taken or that the 
principles of proportionality and distinction were adequately observed.32 
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which tracks drone strikes around the world, 
has reported that, in Pakistan, drone strikes have killed some 472–885 civilians, 
including 176 children, out of a total of 2,593-3,387 persons killed.33 The Bureau also 
reports the use of secondary drone strikes on apparent “first responders” shortly after 
a first strike.34 Significant civilian casualty reports raise serious questions about 
                                                 
 
32 Numerous examples of strikes for which evidence has been brought forward of civilian 
harm is available on the Bureau’s website, and also in a report published by human rights 
clinics at Stanford and NYU; STANFORD INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION CLINIC AND GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, LIVING UNDER 
DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM U.S. DRONE PRACTICES IN 
PAKISTAN, (Sept., 2012), http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ 
Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf [hereinafter LIVING UNDER DRONES]. 
Recently, the Times published a very detailed report of evidence of civilian harm following a 
U.S. strike in Pakistan on October 24, 2012. According to alleged witnesses and victims 
interviewed by the Times, a 67-year-old woman was killed, and a number of children injured. 
See Robin Pagnamenta, My Dead Mother Wasn’t an Enemy of America. She was Just an Old Lady, 
TIMES (London) (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/ 
article3605267.ece.  
33 See Covert War on Terror–The Data, supra note 6. The Bureau’s numbers are primarily based 
on its compilation and aggregation of media reports of strikes and deaths. This raises 
important issues about the accuracy of the numbers reported by the Bureau, given the 
constraints of on-the-ground media reporting in Northwest Pakistan, combined with non-
transparent U.S. practices. See LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 34, at 29–54 Nevertheless, a 
number of studies have found that, of the current drone strike aggregators, the Bureau’s data is 
the most transparent and contains the most accurate reflection of available media reporting. 
See id. at 53–54; see also COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, COUNTING DRONE 
STRIKE DEATHS (Oct. 2012), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/ 
files/microsites/human-rights-institute/COLUMBIACountingDronesFinalNotEmbargo.pdf.  
34 See Chris Woods, Get the Data: Obama’s Terror Drones, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISM (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/04/ 
get-the-data-obamas-terror-drones/; Scott Shane, U.S. Said to Target Rescuers at Drone Strike 
Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/ 




whether the principles of distinction and proportionality have been met. Similarly, 
concerns have been raised about adequate precautions and distinction following 
contentious revelations by anonymous government sources to the New York Times 
that adult males were generally counted as “combatants” if they were killed in a strike 
zone.35 The so-called “signature strikes,” in which targets are chosen based on 
patterns of behavior, are also troubling.36 And, if civilian “rescuers” are intentionally 
being targeted in drone attacks in a situation of armed conflict, there is no doubt 
about the law: those strikes are war crimes. 
The use of the term “targeted killing” can be misleading in the context of some 
strikes, since it creates the impression that little violence occurs and only the “target” 
is affected. It is true that a specific drone strike target may be identified with 
precision, and that immediate collateral damage in a particular case may be reduced. 
But because drones effectively eliminate the personal risk to the soldiers of the state 
using it, they enable this form of targeted killing to be used more often, with 
attendant risks to civilians. Furthermore, and as documented in first-hand testimony 
of witnesses and victims in a recent report by law clinics at Stanford and New York 
Universities (co-authored by Sarah Knuckey), there is evidence indicating that 
targeted killings and drone strike practices have negative impacts on civilian mental 
health, educational and economic opportunities, and community institutions.37  
The requirements of transparency and accountability with respect to the use of force 
apply under international human rights law as well as under IHL. The “first line of 
defense” against violations of the right to life is at the level of the national legal 
system. But if violations are not properly addressed domestically, the position of the 
state in question becomes a matter of legitimate international concern. This is the 
kind of accountability that the U.N. Human Rights Council deals with on a regular 
basis – for example, currently with respect to Syria, and previously with respect to Sri 
Lanka. Accountability for violations of the right to life is not a matter of choice or 
policy; it is a duty to be observed under both domestic and international law in all 
cases. 
Consistent with the demands made by successive U.N. Special Rapporteur mandate 
holders over the last decade, the U.S. public and the international community urgently 
need clarity from the governments concerned on the general question about the legal 
                                                                                                                            
 
Attacks on Rescuers” in Pakistan, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/06/04/ciarevives-attacks-on-rescuers-in-
pakistan/. 
35 See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret “Kill List” Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, 
N.Y. TIMES, (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-
leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all.  
36 For a detailed analysis of the legal concerns raised by signature strikes, see Kevin Jon 
Heller, supra note 27. 
37 See LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 34, at 73–101.  
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basis upon which they carry out targeted killings, and also transparency about the 
facts that make a full assessment of legality and accountability possible. Key questions 
include: Who has been killed? What was the factual basis for targeting them? Were 
there civilian casualties and what procedures are in place to ensure compliance with 
international law? Only on this basis can the questions of legality be determined, and 
can redress be provided where necessary. Continuing failures to provide such basic 
information undermines democratic accountability, meaningful public debate about 
crucial policies, and ultimately the supervisory role of international law. Occasional 
“leaks” and anonymously sourced official accounts provided to journalists have 
provided some further details about U.S. practices, but have also raised concerns 
about the targeted killing program’s compliance with international law. And they are 
no substitute for official statements and formal cooperation with existing domestic 
and international accountability mechanisms.  
Current U.S. practices, together with vague legal justifications or those purporting to 
expand the circumstances in which states may kill their own or other states’ citizens, 
threaten to undermine crucial international legal protections and the system of 
international accountability established after World War II. Other states have also 
thus far failed to hold the U.S. to account, or to adequately respond to U.S. practices 
or its novel legal interpretations. Individuals and states have always faced security 
threats. The existing legal frameworks were developed to balance legitimate security 
concerns with respect for territorial integrity, state sovereignty, the rule of law, due 
process, and individual rights.38 Current targeted killing practices risk weakening the 
rule of law and disrupting settled restraints on the use of force. They could also set 
dangerous precedents for the future.  
The international regulatory framework is often slow in responding to developments, 
including technological ones, and its response to the use of armed drones is no 
exception. The rapid proliferation of drones calls for a concerted international 
response. It is clear how difficult it can be to regulate new technologies once they are 
already developed and in use. In a number of important areas, however, the 
international community still has an opportunity to act in advance of new 
developments. We currently face many new issues – such as the domestic 
proliferation of police surveillance drones, which, without strong regulation, will pose 
serious risks to privacy and may undermine, for example, the exercise of protest 
rights.39 The potential deployment of police drones equipped with less-lethal or lethal 
                                                 
 
38 See generally ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION: REPORT OF THE EMINENT JURISTS 
PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION OF JURISTS (2009), http://www.ifj.org/assets/docs/028/207/3e83f1c-
fbfc2cf.pdf. 
39 See JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING 
PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF 




weapons also lies on the horizon.40 The prospect of domestic police drones needs 
urgent attention from civil society and governments. Furthermore, the development 
of lethal autonomous weapons systems is on the horizon.41 Weapons may in the 
                                                                                                                            
 
protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf (describing U.S. domestic drone surveillance, and 
privacy implications); Asher Moses, Privacy Watchdog Urges Debate on Aerial Drones, Brisbane 
Times.Com (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/technology/technology-
news/privacy-watchdog-urges-debate-on-aerial-drones-20120912-25ri4.html (discussing 
privacy implications of drones in Australia); Nikolaj Nielsen, EU Components Used in Belarus Spy 
Drones, NGO Says, EU Observer (Sept. 10, 2012, 9:03 PM), 
http://euobserver.com/foreign/117489 (citing to concerns expressed by Belarus civil society 
that the government may use drones to impinge on the rights of protesters); Noel Sharkey & 
Sarah Knuckey, Occupy Wall Street’s “Occucopter” – Who’s Watching Whom?, Guardian (Dec. 21, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/21/occupy-wall-
street-occucopter-tim-pool (discussing citizen and police drones); Citizen and Police Drones, 
Panel at LeftForum Conference (Pace University, New York, March, 2012) (panel organized and 
moderated by Sarah Knuckey, addressing legal and policy issues in the use of domestic 
surveillance drones). 
40 See Groups Concerned Over Arming of Domestic Drones, CBS (May 23, 2012 1:18 PM), 
http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/05/23/groups-concerned-over-arming-of-domestic-
drones/ (reporting that Chief Deputy Randy McDaniel, Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, 
Texas, stated that “his department is considering using rubber bullets and tear gas in its 
drone.”). But see Jonathan Kaminsky, Seattle Police Plan for Helicopter Drones Hits Severe Turbulence, 
REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/27/us-usa-drones-
seattle-idUSBRE8AQ10R20121127, McDaniel recently said he no longer wanted to equip his 
drones with weapons. See Jason Gilbert, ShockerDrone: Hackers Attack Shocking Material to Drone 
Helicopter, Chase People, Stun Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 6:07 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/30/shockerdrone-hackers-attach-stun-gun-drone-
helicopter_n_1843999.html (describing the arming of the $299 Parrot AR Drone with a stun 
gun). Recently, the International Association of Chiefs of Police proposed guidelines for the 
use of police drones. See RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT, AVIATION COMM. OF THE INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/IACP_UAGuidelines.pdf.  
41 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 39–40 (2011) (noting that 
the deployment of lethal autonomous robotics would represent a “paradigm shift and major 
qualitative change in the conduct of hostilities,” and that “current norms do not sufficiently 
regulate some of the challenges posed and might need to be elaborated.”); Interim Rep. of the 
Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly, supra note 17 (outlining legal concerns around the 
development of autonomy); Sarah Knuckey, International Law and Lethal Autonomous Robotics, 
International Drone Summit, co-hosted by the Center for Constitutional Rights, Reprieve, and 
CodePink, (Washington, D.C., Apr. 2012) (noting the need to address ethical and legal 
concerns around autonomy before the technology is deployed); see also HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH & HARVARD LAW SCHOOL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, LOSING 
HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (November 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-0. In his 2013 report to the 
Human Rights Council, Christof Heyns will deal with the human rights and humanitarian law 
impacts of lethal robotic technologies. 
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future be programmed to autonomously locate, select, and “decide” who should be 
targeted for lethal attacks. The international community needs to confront squarely 
the dangers posed by these technologies before they are already in use.  
Let us fast forward ten, or perhaps just five, years. Should there be an international 
legal order that permits governments around the world to operate “secret” and 
unaccountable programs to eliminate their enemies wherever they are with few 
binding limits and no meaningful international scrutiny? Some officials no doubt hope 
that they can successfully expand the scope of lawful killings through sheer force of 
repetition of practice and claims of “legality.” This cannot and should not be 
accepted. The international community should act to uphold and restore the integrity 
on the international rule of law, and the protections guaranteed by human rights and 
international humanitarian law. 
 
